Abstract. We show how security type systems from the literature of languagebased noninterference can be represented more directly as predicates defined by structural recursion on the programs. In this context, we show how our uniform syntactic criteria from [7, 8] cover several previous type-system soundness results.
Thus, the typing of an expression or test is uniquely determined by its minimal type, defined as follows:
minTp e = {sec x. x ∈ Vars e} minTp tst = {sec x. x ∈ Vars tst}
The minimal typing operators can of course recover the original typing relation :: as follows: Lemma 1. The following hold: (1) e :: l iff minTp e ≤ l. (2) tst :: l iff minTp tst ≤ l.
Volpano-Smith possibilistic noninterference
In [11, §4] , the typing of commands (which we denote by :: 1 We think of c :: 1 l as saying:
-There is no downwards flow in c.
-l is a lower bound on the level of the variables that the execution of c writes to.
(This intuition is accurately reflected by Lemma 2 below.) Actually, [11] does not explicitly consider a rule like (PAR), and in fact uses parallel composition only at the top level. However, it does require that the thread pool (which can be viewed as consisting of a number of parallel compositions) has welltyped threads, which is the same as typing the pool to the minimum of the types of its threads-this is precisely what (PAR) does. (Also, in [11] , the rule (WHILE) has the assumption c :: 1 lo rather that c :: 1 l-this alternative is of course equivalent, thanks to (SUBTYPE).)
Due to the subtyping rule, here we have a phenomenon dual to the one for expressions and tests: if a command has type l and k ≤ l, then it also has type k-thus, the typing of a command, if any, is uniquely determined by its maximal type. The difference from expressions and tests is that such a type may not exist, making it necessary to keep a "safety" predicate during the computation of the maximal type. For example, consider the computation of the minimal type of If tst c 1 c 2 according to the (IF) rule: Assume l 0 is the minimal type of tst and l 1 , l 2 are the maximal types of c 1 and c 2 , respectively. The rule (IF) requires the three types involved in the hypothesis to be equal, and therefore we need to upcast l 0 and downcast l 1 and l 2 so that we obtain a common type l-thus, we need l 0 ≤ l ≤ l 1 ∧ l 2 . Moreover, l has to be as high as possible. Such an l of course only exists if l 0 ≤ l 1 ∧ l 2 , and in this case the maximal l is l 1 ∧ l 2 . In summary, the rule (IF) tells us the following:
-If tst c 1 c 2 is safe (i.e., type checks) iff c 1 and c 2 are safe and l 0 ≤ l ≤ l 1 ∧ l 2 .
-If safe, the maximal type of If tst c 1 c 2 is l 1 ∧ l 2 .
Applying this reasoning to all the rules for :: 1 , we obtain the function maxTp 1 : com → L and the predicate safe 1 : com → bool defined recursively on the structure of commands: 2
Lemma 2. The following are equivalent: (1) 
Notice that the above clauses characterize the prediactes safe 1 : com → bool and fhigh : com → bool uniquely, i.e., could act as their definitions (recursively on the structure of commands). Since the predicate safe 1 is stronger than fhigh (as its clauses are strictly stronger), we can remove safe 1 c 1 ∧ safe c 2 from the "otherwise" case of the If clause for safe 1 , obtaining:
The clauses for safe 1 and fhigh are now seen to coincide with our [7, 8, §6 ] clauses for ≈ WT and discr ∧ mayT, respectively, with the following variation: in [7, 8 , §6] we do not commit to particular forms of tests or atomic statements, and therefore replace:
-low tst with cpt tst -fhigh atm with pres atm (where atm is an atom, such as x := e) -safe 1 atm with cpt atm Note that the predicates cpt and pres, as defined in [7, 8, §4] , are semantic conditions expressed in terms of state indistinguishability, while low, fhigh and safe 1 are syntactic checks. than syntactic checks as here-the syntactic checks are easyly seen to be stronger, i.e., we have low tst =⇒ cpt tst, fhigh atm =⇒ pres atm and safe 1 atm =⇒ cpt atm.
The main concurrent noninterference result from [11] , Corollary 5.7, states (something slightly weaker than) the following: if c :: 1 l for some l ∈ L, then c ≈ WT c. In the light of Lemma 2 and the above discussion, this result is subsumed by our Prop. 4 from [7, 8] , taking χ to be ≈ WT .
For the rest of the type systems we discuss, we shall proceed with similar transformations at a higher pace.
Volpano-Smith scheduler-independent noninterference
In [11, §7] , another type system is defined, :: 2 , which has the same typing rules as :: 1 
Similarly to Lemma 2, we can prove:
Lemma 3. The following are equivalent:
(1) c :: 2 l (2) safe 2 c and l ≤ maxTp 1 c.
The inferred clauses for safe 2 are the same as those for safe 1 , except for the one for If, which becomes:
Then safe 2 is seen to coincide with siso from [7, 8, §6] .
In [11] it is proved (via Theorem 7.1) that the soundness result for :: 1 also holds for :: 2 . In fact, one can see that Theorem 7.1 can be used to prove something much stronger: if c :: 2 l for some l ∈ L, then siso c. This result is subsumed by our Prop. 4 from [7, 8] , taking χ to be siso.
Boudol-Castellani termination-insensitive noninterference
As we already discussed in [7, 8] , Boudol and Castellani [3, 4] work on improving the harsh Vopano-Smith typing of While (which requires low tests), but they pay a (comparatively small) price in terms of typing sequential composition, where what the first command reads is required to be below what the second command writes. (Essentially the same type system is introduced independently by Smith [9, 10] for studying probabilistic noninterference in the presence of uniform scheduling. Boudol and Castellani, as well as Smith, consider parallel composition only at the top level. Barthe and Nieto [1] raise this restriction, allowing nesting Par inside other language constructs, as we do here.) To achieve this, they type commands c to a pair of security levels (l, l ′ ): the contravariant "write" type l (similar to the Volpano-Smith one) and an extra covariant "read" type l ′ .
sec x = l e :: l (x := e) ::
tst :: l 0 c 1 : c ::
We think of c :: 3 (l, l ′ ) as saying:
-l ′ is an upper bound on the level of the variables that c reads, more precisely, that the control flow of the execution of c depends on.
(This intuition is accurately reflected by Lemma 4 below.) In [3, 4] , the rule for While is slightly different, namely:
However, due to subtyping, it is easily seen to be equivalent to the one we listed. Indeed:
-(WHILE) is an instance of (WHILE') taking l 0 = l ′ . -Conversely, (WHILE') follows from (WHILE) as follows: Assume the hypotheses of (WHILE'). By subtyping, we have tst :: l 0 ∨ l ′ and c ::
, hence, by (WHILE), we have (While tst c) :: 3 (l, l 0 ∨ l ′ ), as desired.
Following for :: 3 the same technique as in the case of :: 1 and :: 2 , we define the functions maxWtp : com → L (read "maximum writing type") and minRtp : com → L (read "minimum reading type") and the predicate safe 3 : com → bool:
Furthermore, similarly to the cases of safe 1 and safe 2 , we have that: Then, immediately from the definitions of maxWtp and minRtp, we have the following:
Then high and low are stronger than safe 3 , and hence we can rewrite the Seq, If and While clauses for safe 3 as follows:
The clauses for safe 3 , high and low are now seen to coincide with our [7,8, §6] clauses for ≈ 01 and discr and siso, respectively.
The main concurrent noninterference result from [3, 4] (Theorem 3.13 in [3] and Theorem 3.16 in [4] ), states (something slightly weaker than) the following: if c :: 3 l for some l ∈ L, then c ≈ 01 c. In the light of Lemma 4 and the above discussion, this result is subsumed by our Prop. 4 from [7, 8] , taking χ to be ≈ 01 .
Matos and Boudol's further improvement
Mantos and Boudol [2, 5, 6 ] study a richer language than the one we consider here, namely, an ML-like language. Moreover, they also consider a declassification construct. We shall ignore these extra features and focus on the restriction of their results to our simple while language. Moreover, they parameterize their development by a set of strongly terminating expressions (commands in our setting)-here we fix this set to be that of commands not containing while loops.
The type system :: 4 from [2, 5, 6 ] is based on a refinement of :: 3 , noticing that, as far as the reading type goes, one does not care about all variables a command reads (i.e., the variables that affect the control flow of its execution), but can restrict attention to those that may affect the termination of its execution.
The typing rules of :: 4 are identical to those of :: 3 , except for the If rule, which becomes:
where k = -There is no downwards flow in c.
-l ′ is an upper bound on the level of the variables that c termination-reads, i.e., that termination of the execution of c depends on.
(In [2, 5, 6] , While is not a primitive, but is derived from higher-order recursionhowever, the effect of the higher-order typing system on While is the same as that of our :: 3 , as shown in [6] . Moreover, due to working in a functional language with side effects, [2, 5, 6] record not two, but three security types: in addition to our l and l ′ (called there the writing and termination effects, respectively), they also record l ′′ (called there the reading effect) which represents an upper bound on the security levels of variables the returned value of c depends on-here, this information is unnecessary, since c returns no value.) Definition 4. We define the function minTRtp : com → L (read "minimum terminationreading type") and the predicate safe 4 : com → bool as follows: minTRtp is defined using the same recursive clauses as minRtp, except for the clause for If, which becomes: Then safe 4 turns out to coincide with our ≈ W from [7, 8, §6] .
The main noninterference result from [2, 5, 6] (in [2] , the soundness theorem in §5), states the following: if c :: 4 l for some l ∈ L, then c ≈ W c. In the light of Lemma 4 and the above discussion, this result is subsumed by our Prop. 4 from [7, 8] , taking χ to be ≈ W .
